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Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical:
The Federal Circuit Correctly Reins in the
Reach of U.S. Patent Law
By Eric Hamp *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

The United States Patent Act generally defines the activities that infringe a U.S.
patent as making, using, selling, or offering to the sell the patented invention within the
United States or importing such an invention into the United States. 1 As such, the reach
of traditional patent law was clearly limited to infringing activities within the United
States and did not extend into foreign territories.
One dramatic departure from this stance is § 271(f) of the Patent Code, which
imposes liability on domestic companies that ship parts of patented inventions to foreign
customers. However, recent Federal Circuit case law made it unclear what inventions
were protected by § 271(f) and when infringement liability would be imposed.
Specifically, it was unclear whether the statute applied to method and process patents.
The Federal Circuit settled this uncertainty in an en banc rehearing for the case of
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 2 overturning its own precedent and
definitively holding that the statute did not extend protection to method patents. 3
This note will first examine the policy and economic motivations for the enactment
of § 271(f) by Congress in Section II. Then, Section III will examine the most important
subsequent Federal Circuit opinions on the subject and the conflicting holdings that
resulted. The following two sections will examine the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the statute and the resulting Cardiac Pacemakers en banc rehearing by the Federal
Circuit. The final sections will analyze the effects of the Federal Circuit’s holding on
domestic companies and illustrate why it was proper for the court to limit the
extraterritorial reach of the statute.
II. THE ORIGINS OF § 271(F)

¶4

Congress originally enacted § 271(f) of the Patent Act to eliminate a loophole
created for patent infringers by the Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp. 4 The patent at issue in Deepsouth was for a machine Laitram invented that cheaply
*

Northwestern University School of Law, Candidate for Juris Doctor in 2011. I would like to thank
Britni Ratliff, James Hamp & Leslie Hamp for their unwavering support throughout my law school
experience.
1
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2007).
2
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
3
Id. at 1359.
4
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
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and efficiently removed shells and veins from shrimp. 5 Laitram’s machine, however,
was a combination of non-patentable parts and only covered a certain, precise
arrangement of these components. 6 After the Fifth Circuit affirmed an injunction against
Deepsouth for infringing Laitram’s patent, 7 Deepsouth sought to avoid further
infringement by manufacturing all of the parts of the invention, partially assembling
them, and shipping the partially assembled machine to foreign customers, who could
complete the final two steps of the assembly easily and quickly. 8
Laitram argued this logic would allow Deepsouth to improperly profit off Laitram’s
invention through a “hypertechnical reading of the Patent Code.” 9 The Supreme Court,
however, disagreed with this assessment, noting that the plain language of the statute
“makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of
the United States.” 10 Because a complete “operable assembly” was needed to make or
sell an invention covered by a combination patent, the Court held that there was no
infringing activity in the United States unless every step of the assembly was performed
domestically. 11 While the Court was conscious of the holding’s ramifications on patent
protection, it justified its position by noting that the Patent Code made no claim to any
extraterritorial effects, and the Court was unable to expand patent rights in such a manner
without a “clear and certain signal from Congress.” 12 While the dissenters bemoaned the
general unfairness of the decision and argued that it lowered incentives for future
innovation, 13 the majority correctly utilized the strong precedent of limiting the
territoriality of U.S. patent protection and deferred to Congress to expand territorial
protection. 14
After the holding of Deepsouth, proponents of strengthened patent protection
sought a congressional remedy to the loophole opened by the Supreme Court. 15 Twelve
years later, Congress obliged by passing § 271(f) of the Patent Code to “prevent copiers
from avoiding U.S. patents by supplying components of a patented product . . . so that the
assembly of the components may be completed abroad.” 16 As subsequent cases would
later make clear, however, the legislative history and precise language of the statute call
into question whether § 271(f) extends to method patents.
The language of § 271(f) created two additional ways manufacturers may be held
liable for infringement. The first new section dictated that manufacturers are liable for
5

U.S. Patent No. 2,825,927 (filed July 8, 1954).
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 520.
7
See Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1971).
8
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524. Deepsouth, it should be noted, had no reservations about frankly utilizing
this loophole simply to avoid infringement, telling its foreign customers the new shipping arrangement was
for the sole purpose of circumventing a “very technical decision” against Deepsouth in the United States.
Id. at 523, n.5. Deepsouth’s openness of its motivations no doubt played a role in the dissenters’ view of
the unfairness of the majority’s holding.
9
Id. at 524.
10
Id. at 527.
11
Id. at 527–28.
12
Id. at 531.
13
Id. at 532–33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14
Id. at 530–31.
15
James R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws: Overreaching Harms U.S.
Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1225–27 (2006).
16
130 CONG. REC. H28069 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (debate on Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383).
6
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inducing infringement by supplying components of a patented invention to foreign
customers:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 17

The second section of § 271(f) followed the language for standard contributory
infringement from the Patent Code. This section of the statute establishes that
manufacturers are liable for infringement when supplying a component to foreign
customers that is specifically needed in a patented invention and has no common noninfringing use:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or
adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 18

¶8

It is clear that both new possibilities for infringement under § 271(f) depend on the word
component. Congress, however, did not explicitly define this term or clearly identify the
applicable scope of the new section. 19 This ambiguity made it unclear whether or not
§ 271(f) extended protection to method patents, despite the statute’s conspicuous failure
to use any of the common terms of art referring to method patents, such as process, act, or
step.
Evidence in the legislative history indicated that the statute was only intended to
apply to components of patented products so as to specifically remedy the holding of
Deepsouth. The Deepsouth opinion was the only fact pattern or problem mentioned
anywhere in the legislative debate over § 271(f), 20 and there were statements that the new
sections were solely enacted in direct response to the loophole opened by Deepsouth. 21
There were also direct statements showing the statute was intended to apply to physical
products, such as Representative Kastenmeier’s assertion that the “bill provides that a
product's patent cannot be avoided through the manufacture of component parts within
17

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2007) (emphasis added).
19
Sean Fernandes, Note, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T: A Welcome Return to Patent Law’s Tradition of
Territoriality, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 75, 86–87 (2008).
20
Farrand, supra note 15, at 1230.
21
130 CONG. REC. H10525 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (“This proposal
responds to the United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth Packing . . . concerning the need for a
legislative solution to close a loophole in patent law.”), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5828, 1984
WL 37541.
18
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the United States for assembly outside the United States.” 22 Furthermore, § 271(g),
which directly addressed process and method patents by imposing infringement liability
for importing a product made by a method or process that was patented in the U.S., was
concurrently drafted although it was not passed for another two years. The legislative
history of § 271(g) implies that the previously enacted section did “not attempt to prevent
the use of the [patented] process in another country.” 23
While there was evidence that Congress only intended § 271(f) to protect product
patents, the ambiguity of the statute’s plain language in defining its scope was still
present because of Congress’s failure to show that the terms component and patented
invention refer to concrete products.24 While the courts did not have much opportunity to
interpret § 271(f) for years after its enactment, 25 patent law authority Donald Chisum
disparaged what he viewed as a clumsy legislative effort to remedy the Deepsouth
holding. 26 Chisum also pointed out that the decision, which was supposed to protect
domestic innovation and production, would provide incentives for manufacturers to
transfer facilities abroad to side-step liability, ultimately harming the U.S. economy. 27
Another potentially negative effect not raised by Chisum was the harm done to the many
U.S. manufacturers that depended on international sales by imposing infringement
liability for supplying components internationally, while manufactures located outside of
the U.S. can make and supply those components without risking liability under § 271(f).
III. APPLICATION OF § 271(F) BY COURTS

¶10

After the initial enactment of § 271(f) by Congress, it appeared that the statute only
imposed infringement liability for tangible inventions and not processes or methods. A
recent wave of decisions, however, went against this precedent and brought into question
the extent of the statute’s application. This section will examine the tension in the
Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence that eventually required the en banc panel to clearly
define the scope of the statute.
A. The Federal Circuit Initially Limits the Extraterritorial Reach of § 271(f)

¶11

In 1991, the Federal Circuit first examined the issue of whether § 271(f) applied to
method patents in Standard Havens v. Gencor Industries. 28 Standard Havens sued
Gencor for infringement of its patent directed to a method of forming various asphalt
compositions. 29 Gencor sold the machine that performed the patented method to foreign
customers, but the Federal Circuit declined to hold Gencor liable under § 271(f). 30 The
court did not provide any reasoning for its decision, however, as the only mention of the
22

130 CONG. REC. H28073 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (emphasis added).
132 CONG. REC. S17386 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1986).
24
Fernandes, supra note 19, at 87.
25
Id.
26
Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from
Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 607 (1997).
27
Id.
28
Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
29
Id. at 1363.
30
Id. at 1374.
23
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statute was the conclusory statement that “[f]inally, we do not find the provisions of 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) implicated.” 31
¶12
While the Court’s holding on the issue was the height of brevity, it was in
accordance with the general assumption at the time that § 271(f) did not extend to method
claims. 32 After the Standard Havens opinion, the question seemed to be settled entirely
and subsequent District Court holdings 33 and scholarly articles 34 further emphasized that
§ 271(f) would not protect process or method patents.
B. The Federal Circuit Greatly Expands the Scope of Protection of § 271(f)
¶13

Despite the holding in Standard Havens, the Federal Circuit later reversed course in
regards to § 271(f)’s application to non-tangible inventions. In Eolas Technologies Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 35 a Federal Circuit panel had to determine what qualified as a
component under the language of § 271(f) when Eolas sued Microsoft for infringing one
of its software product patents. Microsoft sold the Windows operating system overseas
on physical “master discs” 36 that also included the allegedly infringing Internet Explorer
program. 37 Microsoft countered that software code was not a tangible item, as opposed to
a two ton physical machine in Deepsouth, and therefore did not qualify as a component
under the statute. 38
¶14
The panel, however, noted that the plain language of the statute imposed no
“tangibility” requirement on “any component of a patented invention.” 39 The panel then
examined the legislative history of § 271(f) and saw no evidence of intent to limit the
statute to “components of machines and other structural combinations.” 40 Because the
statute included no express narrowing provision on the broad term patented invention, the
panel refused to limit the reach of the statute simply because Microsoft requested it.
¶15
The panel further justified the holding from a public policy standpoint, stating that
courts must provide the same treatment and protection to all forms of inventions, unless
there is a “principled reason” not to do so. 41 The panel justified this point by citing a
provision of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

31

Id.
Farrand, supra note 15 at 1234 (2006).
33
See, e.g., Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“Clearly, had
Congress intended to prohibit U.S. companies from exporting products which allow foreign companies to
make unauthorized use of patented methods, it could have done so in clear, unambiguous language like that
found in § 271(g). Instead, we agree . . . [that § 271(f) is] exclusive[ly] focus[ed] on the sale of
components patented in the United States for combination into a finished product, apparatus, or invention
abroad.”); Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J. 2002) (“Given
[prior] determinations that § 271(f) does not apply to method patents, this Court will refrain from extending
§ 271(f) liability to [the defendant's] activities with regard to [the plaintiff’s method] patents.”).
34
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Divided Infringement Claims, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 117, 121 (2005).
35
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
36
Master discs are the single physical copy of source code provided to outside party manufacturers to
copy the code en mass to computers so the desired programs are installed before the computer is ever
shipped to a retailer or distributor.
37
Eolas, 399 F.3d. at 1331.
38
Id. at 1340.
39
Id. (emphasis added).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 1339.
32
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Agreement. 42 This was likely an effort to justify the reasoning of the decision and its
extraterritorial impact by citing to a supporting authority that obviously considered
international effects while determining the proper scope of patent protection. As a final
vindication for the holding that components of an invention do not need to be tangible,
the panel noted that in the advanced field of computer technology, the practical reality is
that the line between intangible software code and physical hardware was blurred and
often changing, which further removed any need to differentiate between tangible and
non-tangible components. 43
In the months following Eolas, three Federal Circuit opinions came out in quick
succession that further delved into the scope of § 271(f). The first, AT&T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., 44 was factually very similar to Eolas and supported its holding. The
court again found Microsoft liable for infringement by supplying master discs of code to
foreign customers that allowed mass international production of software that, when
installed on a computer, infringed AT&T’s patent for an apparatus that digitally encoded
speech. 45
The court first used Eolas to show that software was a component, even though it
was not a physical structure, and then to show that the word supply in § 271(f) should be
construed broadly, especially considering the ease of software replication. 46 Because the
master disc was used to produce many copies of the software, the court held that
Microsoft supplied all of these copies even though only a small number of physical
master discs were shipped abroad. 47 When Microsoft argued against the public policy of
the decision, stating that it incentivized moving facilities overseas, the court noted that
Congress enacted § 271(f) despite that possibility, so dissatisfaction with the results of
the statute should be directed to Congress, not the courts. 48
Just after the AT&T holding, however, the Federal Circuit issued language that
seemed to discourage applying § 271(f) to method claims in NTP, Inc. v. Research In
Motion, Ltd. 49 NTP, a non-practicing entity, alleged RIM infringed several of its patents
that were related to the hardware, software, and email subscription services offered by
RIM for its Blackberry product. 50 While the case is generally known for being a
prominent example of a non-practicing entity allegedly “trolling” for profits, NTP’s
lawsuit against RIM also provided the Federal Circuit another opportunity to comment on
§ 271(f) and foreign use of methods patented in the United States.
In NTP, the Court held that RIM was not liable for infringement under § 271(f)
because the Blackberry product was sold in the United States, meaning it was therefore
impossible to subsequently supply any components of the invention outside the country

42

Id.; Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, Part II, Section 5 (1994)
(“[P]atents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention
[and] the field of technology.”).
43
Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339.
44
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
45
Id. at 1368.
46
Id. at 1370–71.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1372.
49
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174
(2006).
50
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01CV767, 2003 WL 23325540 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003).
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since the patent rights were already exhausted. 51 While the opinion did not extensively
focus on § 271(f) because other provisions of the Patent Code were more applicable to
the facts, the Court did note that “it is difficult to conceive of how one might supply or
cause to be supplied all or a substantial portion of the steps of a patented method in the
sense contemplated by the phrase ‘components of a patented invention.’” 52
Although this phrase was dicta under the facts of the case, its criticism of Eolas
showed the growing rift in the Federal Circuit concerning the interpretation of § 271(f).
The Court then further emphasized that method patents were not entitled to
extraterritorial protection by holding that RIM did not infringe NTP’s method patents
because one step of the patented method was performed on a Canadian relay server,
meaning that the method was not completely performed in the United States. 53
While the Eolas opinion established that § 271(f) should not discriminate between
the forms of various inventions, the patent in that case was determined to be a tangible
product (software code on a physical structure such as a disk); and therefore, the
language referring to process and method claims was technically dicta. 54 This reasoning,
however, was used to specifically affirm the applicability of § 271(f) to process and
method claims in the case of Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co. 55
Union Carbide had patented a method for large scale commercial production of
ethylene oxide that relied on the use of particular silver-based chemical catalysts.56 The
Federal Circuit Panel cited to the passage from Eolas stating that every component of
every invention is protected by § 271(f) and that this broad definition of patented
invention “makes no distinction between patentable method/process inventions and other
forms of patentable inventions.” 57
The Court contrasted the facts of the present case from those of NTP, stating that
that case dealt with domestic sales of components that were then subsequently used
outside the United States. This meant that NTP was simply liable for standard
infringement under § 271(a) of the Patent Code for selling a patented invention, and not
liable under § 271(f). Union Carbide, in the opinion of the Court, was analogous to
Eolas since the accused infringer was supplying goods internationally that would infringe
a domestic patent.
The reasoning of the Court in Union Carbide and the treatment of previous
opinions left the holding open to criticism. The opinion failed to mention Standard
Havens at all and ignored its clear holding in favor of statements from Eolas that were
arguably dicta. The holding in Union Carbide, however, was explicit and helped usher in
the greatest expansion of U.S. patent law extraterritoriality along with AT&T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp. 58
51

NTP, 418 F.3d at 1322.
Id. (emphasis added).
53
Id. at 1318.
54
Id. at 1322 (“Eolas held that software code—even if intangible—is a component of a patented product
within the meaning of § 271(f) . . . [t]he holding does not impact the application of section 271(f) to the
method claims in the present appeal.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
55
Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
56
Id. at 1369–70.
57
Id. at 1379.
58
AT&T, 414 F.3d. 1366.
52
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In 2006, the Federal Circuit denied Shell’s petition for an en banc rehearing. 59
Judge Lourie wrote the dissenting opinion, arguing that both Eolas and AT&T were
distinguishable cases since they focused on non-method claims. 60 Judge Lourie also
noted that the structure of § 271 as a whole showed that § 271(f) did not apply to process
claims and pointed out Union Carbide’s obvious indifference to the Standard Havens
holding. 61 Even though the Federal Circuit declined to rehear the case, the opinion
further fueled legal debate on the subject of whether the extension of § 271(f) went too
far. 62 This may have provided the motivation for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the
issue when it granted certiorari to the AT&T decision. 63
IV. THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES THE LANGUAGE OF § 271(F) IN MICROSOFT V. AT&T

¶26

In 2007, the Supreme Court curtailed the expansion of § 271(f) somewhat by
reversing the Federal Circuit’s holding in AT&T. 64 While the Court’s holding directly
applied to software and not method patents, the narrowed interpretation of the words
component and supply resulted in a clear intention to interpret § 271(f) in a nonexpansive manner.
¶27
There were several motivations for the Court’s holding, but the strongest was the
general presumption against extending United States patent law into other countries. 65
The first sentence of the opinion emphasized this general rule, although the Court later
conceded that § 271(f) did provide an exception. 66 By starting the opinion with this
general presumption against extraterritorial liability, however, the Court clearly
established what factor would be the dominant consideration when weighing the various
policy considerations.
¶28
The Court briefly discussed the Deepsouth holding and the subsequent passage of
§ 271(f). 67 The Court further stressed the foundational principle against extraterritorial
effects and noted that a “clear Congressional indication of intent” was needed to
surmount this presumption. 68 The Court then reasoned that § 271(f) was enacted by
Congress to address the narrow and specific issue raised by the Deepsouth holding. 69
Therefore, the “exceptional” nature of § 271(f) demanded judicial restraint in its
interpretation and application. 70 With this framework established, the Court then
examined the definitions of the critical terms component and supply.
¶29
The Court first held that software code did not qualify as a component of an
invention under the language of § 271(f). 71 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted
59

Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 434 F.3d 1357, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1358 (Lourie J., dissenting).
61
Id. at 1358–59.
62
Denise W. DeFranco et al., Technology and the Global Economy: Progress Challenges the Federal
Circuit to Define the Extraterritorial Scope of U.S. Patent Law, 34 AIPLA Q. J. 373, 393 (2006).
63
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 549 U.S. 991 (2006).
64
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
65
Id. at 441.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 444.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 442. See also Fernandes, supra note 19, at 93.
71
Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 450.
60
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various common definitions of the term such as constituent part, element, or ingredient,
all of which did not seem to apply to abstract software code. 72 More importantly, the
Court examined the portion of § 271(f) that referred to the combination of various
components and stated that the statute therefore applied only to components that “are
combined to form the ‘patented invention’ at issue.” 73
The Court then stated that because software code was an abstract concept with no
sort of physical embodiment, it could not be a component of any physical or tangible
invention. 74 While the code holds specific details about a component, similar to a
blueprint or a schematic, it cannot be physically combined with other components and
therefore escapes the reach of the statute. 75 Therefore, no infringement occurs without
transcribing the code onto a physical thing, such as a CD-ROM, and even if this transfer
step is very quick or simple, a physical embodiment is required to have an infringing
component under § 271(f) for a product patent.76
The Court also noted that Congress did not identify information or instructions in
the statute, and therefore the use of component required some sort of physical
embodiment. 77 While the issue before the Court was whether software was a component,
the Court’s requirement of a tangible object was clearly a more narrow construction of
this critical term that could have widespread effects.
The court then analyzed whether companies exporting master discs were supplying
a component as required by § 271(f). Despite the ease of replication, the Court held that
only the shipped “master disc” was supplied to foreign customers because the copies of
the software were not made until the foreign customer used the master disc. 78 No matter
how easy Microsoft made it to mass produce the software, it was not responsible for the
downstream activities of the foreign companies and could not be held liable for supplying
any copies made by those customers. 79 Congress had to have been aware of the
simplicity of mass producing the software, yet there was still a complete “absence of
anything addressing copying in the statutory text.” 80 This meant that it was improper for
the Federal Circuit to consider these activities and broaden the definition of supplies.
The Court ended the opinion by restating the importance of the presumption against
extraterritoriality and noting that “any doubt” on the reach of § 271(f) should be resolved
in deference to this presumption. 81 In particular, the Court noted that this presumption
carries even greater weight in the realm of patent law, as the Patent Code frequently uses
language limiting patentee’s rights to the United States. 82 While conceding that § 271(f)
was specifically enacted to surmount this presumption, the Court stressed that it was
enacted to regulate a certain type of activity, and “the presumption is not defeated . . . just

72

Id. at 449, n.11.
Id. at 449.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 450.
76
Id. at 449.
77
Id. at 451.
78
Id. at 453.
79
Fernandes, supra note 19, at 94.
80
Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 454–55.
73
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because [a statute] specifically addresses [an] issue of extraterritorial application, it
remains instructive in determining the extent of the statutory exception.” 83
¶34
The reasoning of the Court clearly meant to limit the Federal Circuit’s expansion of
§ 271(f) protection. The holding, however, was limited under the facts of the case and
did not necessarily mean that Union Carbide’s holding was improper. The Court, in fact,
made a point of noting that the opinion did not foreclose § 271(f) protection of method
patents, stating that “[i]f an intangible method or process, for instance, qualifies as a
‘patented invention’ under § 271(f) (a question as to which we express no opinion), the
combinable components of that invention might be intangible as well. The invention
before us, however, . . . is a tangible thing.” 84 Furthermore, the Court declined to rule on
whether or not intangible things are always foreclosed from being a component, even if
the patented invention is not a tangible, physical product. 85
¶35
Despite these qualifications, the holding did make it clear that the Court
disapproved of expansive interpretations of § 271(f).
Because the statute has
extraterritorial effects, the Court explicitly declined to give the language “an expansive
interpretation” and deferred to Congress the authority to alter the statute if necessary. 86
Therefore, the Court may have not chosen to issue a sweeping mandate on § 271(f)
simply because the facts of the case were too specific and hoped the repeated statements
concerning limited application of the language of the statute would be sufficient to guide
future decisions.
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT READDRESSES § 271(F)’S PROTECTION OF METHOD PATENTS IN
CARDIAC PACEMAKERS V. ST. JUDE MEDICAL
¶36

The Federal Circuit did not have a chance to address the question raised by the
Supreme Court of whether § 271(f) applied to method patents until it heard the case of
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. 87 The long and convoluted patent
dispute centered on Cardiac’s patent for an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD). 88
ICDs are small devices that are attached to the heart and detect abnormal heart rhythms,
correcting these potentially fatal rhythms by administering small and precise electrical
impulses to the heart. 89
¶37
One of Cardiac’s ICD patents, U.S. Patent 4,407,288 (the ’288 patent), claimed a
method of stimulating the heart in this manner. 90 The fourth claim of the ’288 patent,
which was the claim at issue on this particular appeal, is dependent on the first claim of
the ’288 patent. The two claims read in part:
1. A method of heart stimulation using an implantable heart stimulator capable of
detecting a plurality of arrhythmias and capable of being programmed to undergo

83

Id. at 455–56 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 452, n.13.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 442.
87
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
88
Id. at 1351–52.
89
Id. at 1352.
90
Id.
84
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a single or multi-mode operation to treat a detected arrhythmia, corresponding to
said mode of operation the method comprising the steps of:

(a) determining a heart condition of the heart . . . ;
(b) selecting at least one mode of operation of the implantable heart
stimulator . . . ; and
(c) executing said at least one mode of operation of said implantable heart
stimulator thereby to treat said determined heart condition.
***
4. The method of claim 1, wherein said at least one mode of operation of said
implantable heart stimulator includes cardioversion. 91

Cardiac sued St. Jude in 1996, alleging infringement of various Cardiac patents,
including the ’288 Patent. 92 The procedural history of the case is extremely convoluted;
as such, much of it will not be recited here for the purpose of simplicity.
¶38
On remand, the Southern District Court of Indiana denied St. Jude’s motion to limit
the damages under the ’288 patent to domestic sales of the ICD devices even though the
claim at issue was a patented method. 93 At the time, the District Court was following the
Union Carbide precedent that § 271(f) protected method claims. 94 The Federal Circuit,
citing the same precedent, upheld the District Court’s holding despite the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Microsoft v. AT&T. 95 The Federal Circuit first noted that the Supreme
Court specifically did not resolve whether or not § 271(f) applied to method claims, and
that without direction from the Supreme Court, the panel was bound by the earlier
precedent of Union Carbide. 96
¶39
The panel, however, explicitly pointed out that the Federal Circuit was not
unanimously in favor of Union Carbide, but that “as a panel” the precedent was
binding. 97 Therefore, while affirming the District Court’s judgment on this issue, the
opinion was strongly suggest that St. Jude should file a petition for a rehearing en banc.
A. Domestic Industries Clamor for En Banc Rehearing of Cardiac Pacemakers to
Overturn Union Carbide.
¶40

St. Jude, however, was not alone when it filed for the en banc rehearing, as several
industry groups, as well as the American Intellectual Property Law Association, filed
amicus briefs urging the Federal Circuit to overturn Union Carbide. The multiple briefs
filed on behalf of St. Jude illustrated some of the economic and public policy
justifications for excluding method claims from § 271(f). St. Jude and its supporters
argued that the inclusion of method patents into the statute harmed U.S. companies by
exposing them to infringement liability foreign companies were free to avoid. 98 St. Jude
91

U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 (filed Mar. 16, 1981).
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1352.
93
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d. 1021, 1042 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
94
Id. at 1042–44.
95
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 303 F. App’x 884, 893 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
96
Id.
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Id.
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Brief for Cisco Sys. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St.
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also argued that the presumption against extraterritorial effects of United States patent
law required a reversal of Union Carbide. 99
¶41
St. Jude further contended that the Supreme Court’s decision in Microsoft, which
overturned or severely limited the Eolas and AT&T decisions, demanded a reversal of
Union Carbide due to its reliance on those two cases. 100 St. Jude also argued that Union
Carbide went against the precedent of Standard Havens and that Congress had chosen
not to include explicit method or process language when enacting the statute. 101
¶42
Cardiac’s arguments against the rehearing, conversely, did not focus on economic
effects or public policy, but rather a basic interpretation of the plain language of the
statute. Cardiac argued that the term patented invention covers all types of patentable
subject matter and there is no reason to suddenly disqualify the process class from the
term. 102
¶43
In a final attempt to use the Microsoft holding to its advantage, Cardiac noted that
the case clearly allows extraterritorial infringement claims for products. 103 Continuing to
use Supreme Court precedent in an attempt to bind the Federal Circuit, Cardiac then
pointed to statements in Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 104 that equated
apparatus and method claims, 105 meaning that the two classes are not so different that one
must be excluded from § 271(f).
B. The Majority Opinion Expressly Overrules Union Carbide and Holds That § 271(f)
Does Not Protect Method Claims
¶44

The majority opinion for the en banc panel agreed with the arguments of St. Jude
and its supporters, reversing Union Carbide and holding that § 271(f) did not cover
method claims. 106
¶45
The majority first examined the plain language of the statute, but disagreed with
Cardiac’s arguments that the plain language required protection of all classes of
inventions. 107 The majority did concede that in isolation, the term patented invention
includes method patents, but noted that the remaining language of the statute clearly
implies that is not the case. 108
¶46
The majority emphasized that throughout § 271, tangible inventions and method
inventions are treated differently. 109 This shows that Congress believes components of
physical inventions are distinct from the steps that comprise methods and processes.

Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 96-Cv-1718), 2009 WL 1208021 at *4.
99
Defendants-cross appellants Petition for Rehearing en banc, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude
Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 96-Cv-1718), 2009 WL 329925 at *9.
100
Id. at *3–4.
101
Id. at *4.
102
Plaintiff-Appellants Responsive Brief on Rehearing en banc, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude
Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (No. 96-Cv-1718), 2009 WL 1399679 at *5.
103
Id. at *12.
104
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 533 U.S. 617 (2008).
105
Id. at 629.
106
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1359.
107
Id. at 1362.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1363–64.
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While physical objects may be used to perform a portion of a patented process, it is the
step, not the physical object, which is truly a component of a process. 110
¶47
Because of this distinction, the majority reasoned, Cardiac’s contentions failed
because it is impossible to meet the second requirement of § 271(f), supplying the
component, when an intangible step is the component at issue. 111 The standard
definitions of supply 112 imply a transfer of physical objects, and even Cardiac conceded
that this was impossible to do with intangible steps. 113 The majority also referred back to
the statements in NTP providing that “it is difficult to conceive how one might supply or
cause to be supplied all or a substantial portion of the steps in a patented method in the
sense contemplated by the phrase ‘components of a patented invention’ in Section
271(f).” 114 Under this analysis, the majority concluded that the plain language of the
statute did, in fact, preclude the class of processes from the patentable subject matter
protected by § 271(f).
¶48
The majority’s analysis ended with a reliance on the presumption against
extraterritorial effect whenever a statute is ambiguous. 115 The majority also cited the
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of § 271(f) in Microsoft to support the idea that
when U.S. patent law is extended into other countries, it must be done in a limited
manner. 116
¶49
After providing this analysis on § 271(f), the majority stated that the language of
the statute, the legislative history, and the structure of the U.S. patent system all
demanded that method patents not be given extraterritorial protection under the statute. 117
The majority, however, did not raise any economic justifications of the holding, in
contrast with Judge Newman’s dissent. To conclude its opinion, the majority expressly
overruled Union Carbide, the relevant portions of Eolas, and dismissed this portion of
Cardiac’s lawsuit. 118 While the reasoning of the majority is not above criticism, the
opinion finally resolves the rift in Federal Circuit precedent and harmonizes this area of
patent law.
C. Judge Newman’s Dissenting Opinion
¶50

Judge Newman vigorously dissented, arguing with each justification for the
majority panel’s holding and raising additional criticisms of the majority’s logic. Judge
Newman first contended that the plain language of the statute required the term patented
invention to include all types of patentable subject matter. 119 She then argued that since
the express definition of patented invention in the Patent Code includes all types of
patentable subject matter, a class cannot be excluded from the typical definition without a
110

Id. at 1364.
Id.
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clear statement indicating so. 120 She then contended that because § 271(f) contains no
express statement, the statute is unambiguous and its use of the term patented invention
must include processes. 121 Judge Newman also showed that § 271(e), enacted shortly
before § 271(f), uses patented invention to describe all patentable subject matter, and it is
unlikely that Congress would radically diverge from the definition of the term in such a
short amount of time. 122
¶51
Judge Newman then examined the legislative history of the section, noting that the
term machine was replaced with patented invention during the years of debate about the
statute. 123 By referring back to the machine language that was explicitly omitted, the
majority placed a limitation on § 271(f) that Congress itself did not put into the statute. 124
¶52
Judge Newman then countered the majority’s concerns about international comity.
Judge Newman stressed that the reach of § 271(f) only applies to “domestic conduct and
intent” and is simply included to prevent circumvention of patentee’s right. 125 Therefore,
according to Judge Newman, the statute should reach all actions performed in the United
States that are consequently subject to United States law. 126
¶53
Finally, Judge Newman criticized the bright line rule of the majority, which
discounted the complex issue raised by the Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Electronics, Inc., 127 of how to distinguish method and apparatus claims. 128 Judge
Newman lamented that such issues were never even considered by the majority, which
issued a sweeping mandate without regard to today’s complex technologies.129
Colorfully characterizing the majority’s “blunderbuss attack on all process technologies,”
Judge Newman noted, “as in all areas of evolving interests and policy, if statutory change
is warranted, it should be achieved with the participation of all those affected. It is not
the judicial role to dump the statute entirely, as overreaction to the facts of one case.” 130
VI. ANALYSIS—ECONOMIC AND POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF THE EN BANC OPINION
¶54

While there are impassioned supporters on both sides of the issue, the Federal
Circuit reached the correct decision on § 271(f) by limiting the extraterritorial reach of
the statute for several reasons. First, the holding properly avoids overexpansion of U.S.
patent law into foreign jurisdictions. Second, the holding removes economic liabilities
for domestic companies, especially those in the computer industry where the United
States is dominant in the international marketplace. Finally, the holding is the proper
application of the decisions of Congress and the Supreme Court. Therefore, the
economic, public policy and precedential justifications all illustrate that the exclusion of
method claims from § 271(f) is correct.
120
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A. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Law
¶55

The presumption against extraterritorial effects of United States law is particularly
important for patents. Because other countries make different policy judgments when
extending or denying patent protection to various types of inventions, especially in regard
to processes patents, the United States should refrain from attempting to regulate
activities in foreign countries. As pointed out by Cisco Systems in one of the many
amicus briefs filed for the en banc rehearing, medical methods, business methods, and the
very idea of what constitutes patentable subject matter are three examples of instances
where viewpoints and laws vary across the globe. 131 To hold a European company liable
for infringing a business method patent, for example, seems absurd on its face when the
European Patent Convention does not extend patent protection to that subject matter.132
Therefore, courts should be reticent to conflict with these viewpoints without a clear
signal from Congress.
¶56
Furthermore, after the enactment of the Paris Convention Treaty and the TRIPS
agreement, inventors that desire geographically broad intellectual property protection can
more easily acquire foreign patents for their inventions. These agreements have also
strengthened patent protection around the world to a degree not present when Deepsouth
occurred and motivated Congress to initially enact § 271(f).
¶57
In signing the TRIPS agreement the United States has also pledged to respect
foreign nation’s independent patent systems. Furthermore, the fact that is was generally
accepted that § 271(f) did not apply to method claims for several decades shows that
Congress, a body much more capable of evaluating complex foreign policy issues than
courts, did not intend to expand the reach of the statute because it never chose to amend
the law. 133 This last point could be disputed by pointing out that the enactment of
§ 271(f) took over a decade, and virtually all Patent Code reform takes such a long time
that the absence of intervention may not reflect the desires of Congress. Even so,
separation of powers demands that courts not “fix” perceived deficiencies in the law
through case interpretation, but defer to Congress’s ability to properly weigh the
necessary policy considerations.
B. Economic Effects
¶58

Due to the relatively recent holding of the Federal Circuit in Cardiac Pacemakers,
the actual economic effects may not be known for some time, but it is likely that the
overall effects will be beneficial for domestic companies. Before oral arguments, Cisco
Systems led a large contingent of software and computer technology companies in filing
amicus briefs imploring the Federal Circuit to exclude method patents from § 271(f). 134
Even though software code was already outside the reach of the statute after Microsoft,
131

Brief for Cisco Sys. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St.
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4, 27 (2007).
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the widespread industry support illustrates the importance of excluding method and
process patents from § 271(f) to companies that produce complex technology.
There are several ways the United States economy was hindered by the incentives
created by the previous interpretation of § 271(f). First, many domestic businesses,
especially those in industries such as computer technology in which the U.S. is the
dominant economic power, depend greatly on international sales. 135 Allowing § 271(f) to
reach any international sale of a product that may perform a domestically patented
process could subject companies to vast infringement liability for products that are
produced domestically. This is an especially important concern because U.S. law grants
patentability to types of methods that cannot receive patent protection in some foreign
countries. Including method patents in § 271(f), however, would still allow infringement
liability for these foreign sales.
An expansive interpretation § 271(f) also went against the settled expectations
industries, which for decades believed that § 271(f) did not apply to method claims. The
Supreme Court’s statement that “courts must be cautious before adopting changes that
disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community” 136 stressed the importance of
industries’ expectations and reliance on its previous rulings. 137
Finally, there is the extremely common business arrangement of domestic
companies manufacturing some parts at facilities in foreign countries at lower costs,
which often requires exporting instructions, manuals or various items that can perform
processes patented in the United States. An overbroad interpretation of § 271(f) creates
worldwide liability for domestic companies for these types of exports, while foreign
competitors escape this liability even as they enjoy the other benefits of off-shore
production. This potential infringement liability is extremely wide-ranging because it
could conceivably ensnare domestic companies that export anything that is capable of
performing process step or that could somehow be configured to perform a process.
Furthermore, under the first section of the statute, domestic companies are potentially
liable for direct infringement as well as inducing infringement. This type of widespread
global infringement liability from § 271(f) incentivizes companies to move all their
facilities outside of the United States, not just selected manufacturing facilities.
In summary, including method and process patents in § 271(f) would provide
companies with even greater incentives for moving research and manufacturing facilities
overseas to avoid infringement liability. As the widespread industry support for St. Jude
showed, limiting the reach of the statute is in the best interests of domestic industries that
ship products abroad by eliminating a potential source of significant liability that foreign
manufactures are free to avoid. Therefore, the majority panel’s holding results in the best
possible economic incentives for companies in the United States.
C. Proper Application of Precedent & Congressional Intent

¶63

The holding was also the correct application of the controlling precedent and
Congress’s intent for the statute. Only three Federal Circuit cases had applied § 271(f) to
135
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process claims, Eolas, AT&T, and Union Carbide. Eolas and AT&T, however, were
either reversed outright or severely limited by the Supreme Court in Microsoft. 138 The
only enduring case was Union Carbide, and while the case was not expressly overruled,
its holding could not survive the logic of Microsoft requiring that components of an
invention be combinable. 139 In addition, Union Carbide improperly ignored the relevant
and controlling holding of Standard Havens, and therefore the decision was improper
even before the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue.
¶64
The legislative history of the statute also shows the holding was correct. The
language of 271(f) came primarily from § 271(c), but language referring to method or
process claims was explicitly left out. The later enactment of § 271(g), which imposes
liability for importing foreign products made by a process patented in the United States,
further shows Congress did not intended § 271(f) to apply to method patents. 140
VII.

CONCLUSION—THE CARDIAC PACEMAKERS’S HOLDING WAS CORRECT

¶65

The economic and international comity policy factors, combined with the
significant Federal Circuit precedent limiting § 271(f), imply that the issue has probably
been settled. The Supreme Court, however, has recently criticized the Federal Circuit’s
reliance on bright line rules in the KSR 141 and eBay 142 decisions. When one further
considers that the Supreme Court explicitly declined to issue a sweeping mandate for
§ 271(f) regarding all technology fields in Microsoft, it is possible that the Court will
again intervene and limit the Federal Circuit’s holding in Cardiac.
¶66
However, it appears that Cardiac Pacemakers’s holding strikes the proper balance
between international concerns and economic incentives. By limiting the reach of
§ 271(f), the Federal Circuit has further altered how companies can protect their
inventions. Under the current holding, domestic companies should emphasize obtaining
foreign patent protection, as well as attempt to draft claims that read on the inventions
themselves, not simply their method of use.
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